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TOP TENS IN 2017: PATENT, TRADEMARK,
COPYRIGHT, AND TRADE SECRET CASES
Stephen McJohn1
ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court loosened the grip of patentees on their
products, holding that contractual restrictions on patented products are
ineffective to preserve patent rights. The Court also loosened the grip of the
Eastern District of Texas on patent cases, announcing a narrower standard
that will send more cases to Delaware. The Federal Circuit cases piled up on
applying the Alice standard to filter nonpatentable abstract ideas from
patentable inventions. Meanwhile, even as the constitutionality of the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) pends before the Supreme Court, hundreds
of PTAB decisions on the validity of patents move onward to the Federal
Circuit. Other notable patent cases concerned sovereign immunity (such as
transferring patents to avoid PTAB proceedings), the doctrine of assignor
estoppel, the scope of prior art, and patent rights to the gene-editing tool
CRISPR-Cas9. In trademark, the Court held the bar against disparaging
marks was an invalid restraint on freedom of expression. Lower courts
addressed a number of issues in the same area, such as the right to use marks
in titles of work and other expressive purposes. Courts also addressed
whether such terms as “google,” “tequila,” and “universal” have become
generic. In copyright, the Supreme Court gave some guidance on the line
between copyrightable expression and nonprotected functional matter. Other
notable cases addressed the copyrightability of standards and the meaning of
“noncommercial” in open source licenses, along with fair use in new
settings. In trade secrets, courts looked at such key issues as the scope of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the intersection between trade secret and
international trade, and protection for databases.

1 Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This listing and analysis are decidedly
subjective, and all the usual disclaimers apply. Comments welcome: smcjohn@suffolk.edu.
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PATENT
First Sale
3. Can I pass these amazing improvements to my children?
No. Your body and its biological and technological systems are patented
by Colonial Genetics and may not be passed on without permission.
JOHN SCALZI, OLD MAN’S WAR2

To the contrary: as of 2017, patent holders no longer have patent rights
in products they have sold. The Supreme Court in Impression Products v.
Lexmark International held that a first sale exhausts the patent rights of the
seller in that particular item sold, both domestically and internationally.
Resale or use of the item would not be patent infringement. Contractual
restrictions to the contrary will not make it infringement (although they may
still be effective against parties to the sale).3 The Court concluded that:
Lexmark exhausted its patent rights in these cartridges the moment it sold them.
The single-use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark’s contracts with customers
may have been clear and enforceable under contract law, but they do not entitle
Lexmark to retain patent rights in an item that it has elected to sell. 4

The decision rested on the policy of preventing restraints on alienation:
More is at stake when it comes to patents than simply the dealings between the
parties, which can be addressed through contract law. Instead, exhaustion
occurs because, in a sale, the patentee elects to give up title to an item in
exchange for payment. Allowing patent rights to stick remora-like to that item
as it flows through the market would violate the principle against restraints on
alienation.5

In addition, the decision applies to reimportation or importation of
authorized goods (sometimes called “gray market goods”). In another case
touching on imports, the Court held that importing a single component
cannot constitute the “substantial portion” of an infringing device required
2
3

JOHN SCALZI, OLD MAN’S WAR, 85 (Tor ed., 2005).
Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017). The Court stated:

This case presents two questions about the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine: First, whether
a patentee that sells an item under an express restriction on the purchaser’s right to reuse or resell
the product may enforce that restriction through an infringement lawsuit. And second, whether a
patentee exhausts its patent rights by selling its product outside the United States, where American
patent laws do not apply. We conclude that a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of
its patent rights in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the
location of the sale.
Id.
4
5
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Id. at 1531.
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for infringement liability.6 And there remains a need to show importation of
components sufficient to contribute to infringement.7 On a related issue, a
foreign entity that licensed and enforced intellectual property rights in the
U.S. was subject to personal jurisdiction in the U.S.8
Venue
Until 2017, a substantial portion of all U.S. patent cases were filed in
the Eastern District of Texas. In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court rejected
the Federal Circuit’s permissive reading of the patent venue statute.9 When
Congress amended related statutes to broaden the definition of a defendant’s
“residence,” it did not intend to amend the patent jurisdiction statute to have
such a broad sweep.10 Delaware is now the most likely court for patent
infringement cases.11
The Federal Circuit followed the cue, holding that a tenuous link to a
jurisdiction would not support venue there.12 The court rejected the holding
of the Eastern District of Texas that a defendant was doing business in a
jurisdiction where a single employee had his home office there but he “was
not listed in any business directories or websites, . . . he did not maintain
product literature or products at his home, and . . . he was the only employee

6 Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 743 (2017) (“We hold that the phrase
‘substantial portion’ in 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1) has a quantitative, not a qualitative, meaning. We hold
further that §271(f)(1) does not cover the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention.”).
7 Cisco Sys., Inc. v. ITC, 873 F.3d 1354, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
8 Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG, 848 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The
Federal Circuit stated:

Moreover, there are other facts that, under the Burger King analysis, confirm the view that the
burden on the defendant is not undue. For instance, the burden on Papst is mitigated by Papst’s
status as a non-practicing patent holder residing outside the United States. This is not a case
like Red Wing, where the defendant conducts its affairs in one state and is called to litigate in a
distant state rather than its own residence. See 148 F.3d at 1357. By the very nature of its business,
Papst must litigate its patents in the United States in fora far from its home office. In this context
the burden on Papst to litigate in California appears not undue. The lack of significant burden on
Papst is also evidenced by Papst’s prior litigations in California itself. Papst has repeatedly availed
itself of the California federal court system—at least seven times—by filing patent infringement
lawsuits there.
Id.
9 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517–18 (2017). The
Supreme Court also held laches inapplicable in patent cases, as in copyright law. SCA Hygiene Prods.
Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017).
10 TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–1521.
11 Dana Elfin, Creeping Tsunami: Patent Filings up in Delaware After TC Heartland, BLOOMBERG
HEALTH CARE BLOG (Feb 22, 2018), https://www.bna.com/creeping-tsunami-patent-b57982089118/
[https://perma.cc/8X29-UV79].
12 In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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within the district.”13 As to already-filed cases, the Federal Circuit held that
TC Heartland did represent a change in the law, as opposed to simply
correcting the Federal Circuit’s erroneous application of Supreme Court
precedent, and so permitted parties to seek a change of venue.14
Biologic Generics
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 opened
up the way for generic competition in the market for biologics:
pharmaceuticals based on complex molecules.15 The complex statute poses
many interpretive issues such as the choreography of the “patent dance”—
whether a generic manufacturer had to get FDA approval before serving the
required notice before preparing to enter the market to compete with a
pharmaceutical going off patent. In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., its first
decision on the statute, the Supreme Court held that notice could be made
before obtaining approval.1615 The Court further held that a failure to make
the requisite disclosure would not result in an injunction against proceeding
down the path toward generic manufacturing.17
Patentable Subject Matter
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Alice reaffirmed the longstanding rule that abstract ideas, laws of nature, or physical phenomena are
not patentable and formulated a new two-part test to distinguish such from
patentable application of them.18 In 2017, the Federal Circuit continued
applying that test to many cases. A split panel held that a transit system’s
patent on a method of using bank cards for fares is outside patent subject
matter, where the system is simply “directed to the collection, storage, and
recognition of data.”19 The Federal Circuit reversed a jury verdict of over
$500 million20 on the grounds that “the asserted claims are all directed to the
abstract idea of conditioning and controlling access to data based on
payment.”21 A claimed system for using codes to identify and route
13

Id. at 1364.
In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
15 See generally Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan, & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative
History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 Food Drug L.J. 671 (2010).
16
137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668 (2017).
17 Id. at 1675.
18 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355–59 (2014).
19 Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
20 Jan Wolfe, U.S. Appeals Court Tosses Patent Verdict Against Apple, REUTERS (March 1, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-lawsuit-patent-idUSKBN1685D5
[https://perma.cc/TDX96LT9].
21 Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x 977, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
14
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packages during mailing was abstract and non-patentable. 22 Claims on
“multicasting,” (which might apply broadly on the Internet) were held
abstract and non-patentable.23 Another split panel of the Federal Circuit held
patentable claims “directed to an improved computer memory system, not to
the abstract idea of categorical data storage,”24 on the grounds that the
specification (if not the claims themselves) identified specific technological
improvements in the operation of the computer itself.25 The Federal Circuit
has provided some guidance by distinguishing its own precedent.
Patent Validity Challenges Before PTAB
TC Heartland meant that patent litigators would be spending less time
in the Eastern District of Texas. Since the America Invents Act of 2011, a
good portion of patent litigators have already been spending their time at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) instead of federal
court.26 The Act introduced several means to challenge the validity of a patent
in post-grant proceedings before PTAB. Post-grant challenges in various
forms had existed before, but seen relatively little use. The new procedures
are subject to a tighter timeline (of some eighteen months); have much more
limited preclusive effect, which encourages challenges; may look more
22 Secured Mail Sols., LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2017). According
to the Federal Circuit in the case:

[T]he claims of the three sets of patents are not limited by rules or steps that establish how the
focus of the methods is achieved. Instead, the claims embrace the abstract idea of using a marking
affixed to the outside of a mail object to communicate information about the mail object, i.e., the
sender, recipient, and contents of the mail object. Because the claims are directed to an abstract
idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice inquiry.
Id.
23

Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Two-Way Media asserts that the claim solves various technical problems, including excessive loads on
a source server, network congestion, unwelcome variations in delivery times, scalability of networks, and
lack of precise recordkeeping. But claim 1 here only uses generic functional language to achieve these
purported solutions.”).
24 Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
25 Id. at 1259-60. The Federal Circuit analogized precedent:
As with Enfish’s self-referential table and the motion tracking system in Thales, the claims here
are directed to a technological improvement: an enhanced computer memory system. The ’740
patent’s claims focus on a “specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities”—the use of
programmable operational characteristics that are configurable based on the type of processor—
instead of “on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool.”
Id. (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
26 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 Geo. L.J. 619, 620 (2018)
(“Thanks to procedures created by the AIA, however, the number of filings at the PTO has doubled in the
past few years, increasing from about a thousand per year as recently as 2010 to about two thousand per
year today.”).
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broadly to prior art; permit more active participation by the challenger; and
have more extensive appellate review available.27 Thousands of such
proceedings have been brought, and patent claims invalidated in a substantial
number of proceedings.28 The scope of the proceedings, and the very
constitutionality of the process, remain to be settled by the courts.
The validity of patents may now be tested in federal court or before the
PTAB. In Inter-Partes Review (IPR) (by far the most used post-grant
procedure), a challenger may not challenge validity by alleging the patent
covers non-patentable subject matter. Rather, in IPRs, the challenger must
allege the patent did not meet such requirements as novelty, utility, written
description, or nonobviousness.29 So even as the Federal Circuit has weeded
out many patents as beyond patentable subject matter under Alice, the PTAB
has looked mainly to the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. In a
way, the patent system is running an A/B testing experiment, comparing a
system with a strong subject matter requirement to one that relies on the other
requirements of patentability.30
In the multitude of appeals now coming from the PTAB to the Federal
Circuit, obviousness is proving a key issue. The Federal Circuit upheld a
PTAB decision that invalidated as obvious patent claims on a feature
equivalent to a “live pause” on a DVR that would enable a viewer to record
and then watch or skip portions of a broadcast during a brief interruption.31
The Federal Circuit upheld invalidation of a search engine patent challenged
by Google as obvious, one key piece of prior art being World Wide Web
Searching for Dummies.32 The Federal Circuit has, however, readily reversed
the PTAB for making conclusory findings of obviousness without explicitly

27

See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 317–324 (2017) (comparing new post-grant procedures to their
forebears).
28 Jason
Rantanen, Inter Partes Review Statistics, PATENTLY-O (July 28, 2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/07/partes-review-statistics.html [https://perma.cc/45FJ-FNQ6].
29 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 27, at 322 (“Unlike the PGR Process, which can raise any
invalidity ground, IPRs may only challenge lack of novelty or obviousness.”). In IPRs, the patent’s
validity may not be challenged on the theory that it is not within patentable subject matter. In the other
types of post-grant review, Post Grant Reviews and Covered Business Method Reviews, patentable
subject matter may be raised. See id. at 318. For example, over a dissent, a panel of the PTAB concluded
that a patent on a graphical interface for commodities trading was invalid as not directed to patentable
subject matter. IBG LLC v. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc., CBM2016-00031, 2016 WL 5632066 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 8, 2016).
30 Of course, the Federal Circuit also tests validity challenges based on such issues as novelty or
obviousness. See, e.g., Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(patent that claimed basic podcasting technology was invalid as not novel).
31 Dragon Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Dish Network LLC, 711 F. App’x 993, 997–98 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
32 Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1381–84 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
THE
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stated grounds.33 Conversely, the court has invalidated patents as obvious on
appeal, reversing the PTAB’s holding.34 The Federal Circuit loosened the
PTAB’s rules on whether claims may be amended during PTAB
proceedings, which may allow some patent holders to preserve their patents
by amendment to avoid prior art.35
The Federal Circuit, deciding a flood of cases coming from the PTAB,
has affirmed many without opinion—a practice that has been challenged.36
Sovereign Immunity
Patent holders have become very aware of the risks of the PTAB postgrant challenges. Allergan adopted a new tactic to attempt to avoid the
PTAB. It transferred the rights to its lucrative patents on the drug Restasis to
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, agreeing to pay a fee and royalties for an
exclusive license to the patents.37 Tribes have tried a number of methods to
support economic development. As the leader of another group, the Oneida
Nation, has put it, “We tried poverty for 200 years, so we decided to try
something else.”38 However, Judge Bryson of the Eastern District of Texas,
in a pending infringement action, expressed skepticism about the validity of
the transaction:
The Court has serious concerns about the legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan
and the Tribe have employed. The essence of the matter is this: Allergan
purports to have sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the Tribe
to allow Allergan to purchase—or perhaps more precisely, to rent—the Tribe’s

33 See, e.g., In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Divisions remain within the Federal
Circuit on various obviousness issues. See, e.g., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d
724, 731 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (split panel upholding finding that patent on antibiotic Invanz was invalid as
obvious, despite commercial success); Rovalma, S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG, 856 F.3d
1019, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reversing PTAB obviousness determination on grounds that “[t]he Board
has not provided a sufficiently focused identification of the relevant evidence or explanation of its
inferences”).
34 Owens Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
35 Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The matter is remanded for the
Board to issue a final decision under § 318(a) assessing the patentability of the proposed substitute claims
without placing the burden of persuasion on the patent owner.”).
36 Dennis Crouch, Shore v. Lee, PATENTLY-O (May 16, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/tag/affirmedwithout-opinion.
37 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170825,
at *6 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
38 Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Economic Development, 80
N.D. L. REV. 597, 598 (2004) (quoting Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or
Dependence? The Practical Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 531, 568 (1994)).
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sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the
PTO.39

Ali v. Carnegie Institute of Washington illustrated sovereign immunity
in quite a different context. The plaintiff sought to be added as an inventor
to some notable patents on “methods of gene-specific inhibition through the
use of double-stranded ribonucleic acid.”40 “Two of the named co-inventors
of the claimed inventions, Dr. Andrew Fire of Carnegie and Dr. Craig C.
Mello of the University of Massachusetts, received the Nobel Prize in
Medicine in 2006 for these inventions.”41 But because the University of
Massachusetts has sovereign immunity, it could not be added and the suit
was dismissed because that indispensable party could not be joined.
Ericcson shows some limits on sovereign immunity. The University of
Minnesota sought to use sovereign immunity to prevent a challenge to its
patents before the PTAB. But the PTAB ruled that the university had waived
immunity by bringing infringement actions in federal court based on the
same patents.42 If sovereign immunity can keep patents out of the PTAB only
if the owner does not enforce the patents, it is less appealing. In addition,
with sovereign immunity comes sovereign responsibility. Some copyright
licensors, such as state universities, are restricted in their licensing practices
by the constitutional requirement not to discriminate improperly based upon
the expressive rights of potential licensees.43 Discriminatory technology
licensing arguably runs afoul of the protections for free expression.
Scope of Prior Art
The America Invents Act of 2011 made a number of significant changes
to patent law, such as switching patent priority from first inventor to first to
file and instituting a new system of post-grant challenges in the PTAB. 44 One
issue was whether the statute changed the class of references that could bar
patent rights. A patent applicant may not claim an invention that has been in
39

Allergan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170825, at *10. Additionally, in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the Federal Circuit also recently held that “tribal sovereign immunity cannot be
asserted in IPR.” 896 F.3d 1322, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
40 Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Wash., 684 F. App’x 985, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
41 Id.
42 Order Denying Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at __, Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University
of Minnesota, No. IPR2017-01186 at 11 (P.T.A.B. December 19, 2017).
43 Cf. Gerlich v. Leath, 847 F.3d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Similar to the university in Gohn, ISU
followed an unusual trademark approval process with respect to all of NORML ISU’s trademark design
applications after the Des Moines Register article was published. Moreover, defendants at least implied
that the additional scrutiny imposed on NORML ISU was due to the views for which it was advocating.
Finally, defendants were motivated at least in part by pressure from Iowa politicians.”).
44 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 27, at 200-206 (discussing first-inventor-to-file priority rules under
the America Invents Act); id. at 317-324 (discussing post-grant challenges).
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“public use” or “on sale” as of the critical date. In plain language, a patent
application must claim a new invention, not one already in public use or on
sale (or patented or published). The courts have long construed public use to
include private uses controlled by the inventor, in order to prevent inventors
from dallying before claiming patent rights.45 The 2011 statute tightened the
bar against claiming inventions already in public use or on sale, but added
the words “or otherwise available to the public.”46 Some would construe this
as limiting “public use or on sale” to actual public use or public sales.47 But
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. stated that the term would
be construed with the same meaning, under the theory that if Congress
intended such a sweeping change in the law, it would have done so more
clearly.48
Assignor Estoppel
The Federal Circuit has continued to apply the doctrine of assignor
estoppel in patent cases.49 “Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that
prevents one who has assigned the rights to a patent (or patent application)
from later contending that what was assigned is a nullity.”50 Courts reason
that “an assignor should not be permitted to sell something and later to assert
that what was sold is worthless.”51 A patent applicant also signs an oath,
affirming their belief that the patent is valid. But it is a live question whether
applying the doctrine broadly makes sense today when patent rights are often
assigned but not really sold.52 Employees typically sign over future patent
rights when taking a job and the doctrine may protect the employer, who
controls the application. An applicant may have no reason to doubt his or her
invention’s patentability but may learn later of work in the field that made
their invention obvious. Or the applicant may simply have misunderstood
the legal effect of the claims in the application, and their relation to the
employee’s work. The doctrine creates an implied promise not to contest the
patent, which would be nonenforceable if an explicit clause by a licensee
under Lear.53 Extending the rationale to licensors would not be a large step.

45

See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1367–1368.
47 Id. at 1368.
48 Id. at 1370.
49 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In Diamond
Scientific, we emphasized the continued vitality of the doctrine of assignor estoppel after Lear.”).
50 Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
51 Id. at 1224.
52 A cert. petition was pending as of the end of 2017.
53 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
46
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CRISPR-Cas9
The most notable interference proceeding to survive the enactment of
the America Invents Act concerned a dispute about the right to patent the
basic technology of CRISPR-Cas9 “gene editing” techniques. Decisions in
the USPTO and the European Patent Office favored both sets of contenders
to a limited extent.54 Obviousness was the key issue in the USPTO in this
proceeding as well.55 Groups from Berkeley and MIT disputed priority of
rights on the key patents on the groundbreaking technique.56 The USPTO
determined that neither party had priority, rather that the applications were
on separate inventions.57 Although the Berkeley group might have invented
the use of CRISPR in the DNA of cells, that did not make obvious the
invention of the MIT group—how to use CRISPR in eukaryotic cells (such
as plant, animal, and fungi).58 The appeal in Regents of University of
California v. Broad Institute, Inc. was decided by the Federal Circuit with a
ruling in favor of Harvard and MIT and their patents.59 Rights in other
jurisdictions, such as Europe, are also contested.60
Attorney’s Fees in Patent Appeals
An unsuccessful patent or trademark applicant may appeal the
USPTO’s decision to the Federal Circuit or to a United States district court.
A possible advantage of appealing to the district court is that the party may
introduce new evidence,61 whereas an appeal to the appellate court is limited
to the record before the USPTO. The calculus has an unusual element. Some
courts have held that even a successful trademark applicant before the district
court is obliged to pay the attorney’s fees of the USPTO, under the relevant
statutory provision.62 The ruling on patent cases, however, was later vacated
54 Kelly Servick, Broad Institute takes a hit in European CRISPR patent struggle, SCIENCE (Jan. 18,
2018),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/01/broad-institute-takes-hit-european-crispr-patentstruggle [https://perma.cc/ME2W-7TL8].
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.; see also Kevin E. Noonan, The CRISPR Chronicles -- Broad Institute Wins One and Loses
One, PATENT DOCS (January 24, 2018), http://www.patentdocs.org/2018/01/the-crispr-chronicles-broadinstitute-wins-one-and-loses-one.html [https://perma.cc/L35D-KMM8].
58 No. 106, 048, 2017 WL 657415, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017).
59 No. 2017-1907, 2018 WL 4288968 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 2018).
60 Servick, supra note 54.
61 See Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445-46, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700-01 (2012) (“For these reasons,
we conclude that there are no limitations on a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence in a
§ 145 proceeding beyond those already present in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”).
62 See Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2015) (trademark case).
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and the Federal Circuit took the case en banc, raising the possibility of
differing readings of very similar provisions from the two statutes.63
TRADEMARK
“Are We Running Out of Trademarks?”
Two law professors issued a detailed empirical study on the possible
depletion of potential trademarks.64 As they put it:
To give a sense of how many of the most frequently used words are thereby
claimed, in 2015, 20,024 (23.2%) of the 86,408 most frequently used words in
American English were claimed as single-word marks. These 20,024 words
account for 74.3% of all word usage. Moreover, 816 of the 1,000 most
frequently used words identically matched an active single-word mark, and
6,121 (61.2%) of the 10,000 most frequently used words did so (Table 1). The
data also show a steady increase in the proportion of the U.S. population
carrying a surname claimed as a single-word trademark (Figure 2). We estimate
that at least 55 percent of Americans currently carry a surname that is already
claimed as a single-word mark.65

The authors found evidence that the diminishment is affecting
marketing practices: “Given these conditions, new applicants are
increasingly resorting to suboptimal marks. The data indicate that applicants
are applying less often for standard English words and common surnames
and more often for more complex marks, as measured by character, syllable,
and word count.”66
So future brand names in a sci-fi novel may indeed be bland terms often
used before.
1. Does My New Body Have a Brand Name?
Yes! Your new body is known as the Defender Series, XII, “Hercules”
model. Technically, it’s known as CG/CDF Model 12, Revision 1.2.11.
JOHN SCALZI, OLD MAN’S WAR67

Or perhaps some technological development will replace trademarks.
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Nantkwest, Inc. v. Matal, 869 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Barton Beebe & Jeanne Fromer, Re: Comment on Possible Streamlined Version of Cancellation
Proceedings on Grounds of Abandonment and Nonuse, Docket No. PTO-T-2017-0012 (Aug. 14, 2017)
(discussing findings of Beebe & Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of
Trademark Depletion and Congestion), https://tushnet.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/beebe-fromercomment-on-streamlined-proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P9Z-2DND].
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 JOHN SCALZI, OLD MAN’S WAR 84 (Tor ed., 2005).
64
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Disparaging Marks
The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act’s prohibition against
registering disparaging marks is invalid, as an unconstitutional limit on free
speech.68 A rock band composed of Asian musicians adopted the mark “THE
SLANTS,” appropriating the slur against Asians for their own use.69 The
USPTO rejected the registration as a disparaging term.70 The Supreme Court
ultimately held that the rule against disparaging marks is an overbroad
limitation on free speech, unrelated to the goals of trademark protection.71
“[T]he proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the
freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”72 The Court also rejected the
argument that registration of a mark is government speech, which the
government has considerable freedom to regulate.73 The prohibitions against
immoral and deceptive matter and marks that bring persons, institutions, or
beliefs into contempt or disrepute are all certainly on shaky ground. The
Federal Circuit held that, under Tam, the bar against registration of “immoral
or scandalous” marks is unconstitutional.74 The cause of action for dilution,
especially in its tarnishment variation, has also come into question.75

68

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
Id. at 1754.
70 Id. at 1751.
71 Id. at 1764–65.
72 Id. at 1764.
73 See id. at 1757 (rejecting arguments “(1) that trademarks are government speech, not private
speech, (2) that trademarks are a form of government subsidy, and (3) that the constitutionality of the
disparagement clause should be tested under a new ‘government-program’ doctrine”).
74 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
75 See Rebecca Tushnet, Slightly Cooler Take on Tam, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (June 21,
2017), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2017/06/slightly-cooler-take-on-tam.html [https://perma.cc/ZN4WTTEA].
69
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More First Amendment and IP

76

The First Amendment may protect mark owners’ right to register, but it
may also protect others’ rights to use the mark for expression. A student
group affiliated with the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws (NORML) had First Amendment rights to use the trademark of Iowa
State University on t-shirts advocating the legalization of marijuana.77 The
university could not establish that use of the mark was government speech,
over which it would have greater control.78

76 Exhibit B at 2, Gerlich v. Leath, No. 4:14-CV-00264-JEG, 2015 WL 4097755 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 6,
2015), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/1413/ [https://perma.cc/434L-HJFP].
77 Gerlich v. Leath, 847 F.3d 1005, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 2017).
78 Id. at 1015 (“ISU allows approximately 800 student organizations to use its trademarks.
Defendants repeatedly stated in their testimony and other record evidence that the university did not
intend to communicate any message to the public by licensing ISU trademarks to student groups. Indeed,
the university licenses its trademarks to groups that have opposite viewpoints from one another like
the Iowa State Democrats and the ISU College Republicans.”).
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79

Handsome Brook Farm, LLC v. Humane Farm Animal Care, Inc. held
that the holder of the Certified Humane mark for chicken egg producers is
not free from regulation of its speech.80 One of its licensees alleged that the
certifier inaccurately notified many of the licensee’s customers that its eggs
were noncompliant with the Certified Humane standards.81 That speech, the
court held, is commercial speech that receives relatively lower constitutional
protection and so could give rise to liability if it amounted to false
advertising.82
Patent disparagement, in a case of first impression, was held to be
protected speech. An Australian court had granted an injunction against a
party for characterizing a patent as “stupid” and explaining that opinion.83
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held
the injunction unenforceable in the U.S. on the grounds that such speech is
constitutionally protected:
Statements 1 and 3-4 are statements of opinion, including opinions which
constitute rhetorical hyperbole and imaginative expression. The broad context
of the article is clearly opinion, as it is a part of EFF’s humorous and pointed
“Stupid Patent of the Month” series, and the article includes aggressive
language including language referring to GEMSA’s legal activities as “abusive
troll litigation.”84

79 Image of Certified Humane logo, CERTIFIED HUMANE, https://certifiedhumane.org/
[https://perma.cc/6HJ8-UX6E ] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
80 Handsome Brook Farm, LLC v. Humane Farm Animal Care, Inc., 700 F. App’x 251 (4th Cir.
2017).
81 Id. at 253.
82 Id. at 262.
83 Elec. Frontier Found. v. Glob. Equity Mgmt. (SA) Pty Ltd, 290 F. Supp. 3d 923, 931 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
84 Id. at 946, 948 (citations omitted).
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First Amendment and Trademarks, Continued

85

86

Empire Distribution, a record label whose music includes hip hop, rap,
and R&B, claimed infringement by Fox for its fictional series Empire which
portrays a fictional hip hop music label.87 The Ninth Circuit held the use
protected, applying the Rogers test. “Under the Rogers test, the title of an
expressive work does not violate the Lanham Act ‘unless the title has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some
artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work.’”88
Nonprotectable Generic Terms

89

85

Image of Empire Distribution logo, EMPIRE, http://www.empi.re (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
Image of Empire television show logo, FOX, http://www.fox.com/empire/.
87 Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distribution, Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2017).
88 Id. at 1196.
89 Image of Consejo Regulador Del Tequila logo, in John L. Welch, Precedential No. 1: TTAB
Dismisses Opposition to TEQUILA Certification Mark Application, THE TTABLOG (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/01/precedential-no-1-ttab-dismisses.html.
86

55

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

One longstanding trademark principle is that the generic term for a
product or service cannot be a trademark for that product or service. One
seller in a market cannot own the very term her competitors need to denote
their product. This applies even where the product is not highly commercial.
For example, the term “Universal” has been held generic for the mark of a
church.90 The rule also applies to foreign terms used in the United States,
such as the term “Magnesita” for refractory products using magnesite.91 But
this rule does not apply where a foreign term often treated as generic in the
United States is in fact not shown to be generic, as was the case with the term
“tequila” for that spirit.92 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that
“google” had become generic because it is often used as a verb; rather, the
key was whether the word was understood to refer to internet search services
generally or to that particular provider of internet search services.93 One court
held that it remained a question of fact whether “Comic-Con” is generic for
comic book conventions.94

90 Universal Church, Inc. v. Universal Life Church/Ulc Monastery, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127362,
at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017). The court stated:

[F]inding that “universal church” is generic would grant plaintiff a monopoly over the word
“universal” as used in church names, a monopoly which plaintiff has already indicated that it
would enforce aggressively. See supra n.13 (listing cease-and-desist letters sent by plaintiff). We
are persuaded that the trademark law is simply not intended to allow the mark to be weaponized
by plaintiff in this way.
Id.
91 See John L. Welch, CAFC Affirms TTAB: MAGNESITA is Generic for . . . . Guess What?, THE
TTABLOG (Nov. 28, 2017), http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/11/cafc-affirms-ttab-magnesita-isgeneric.html [https://perma.cc/ZRN7-NJ7J ] (discussing In re Magnesita Refractories Co., No. 16-2345
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
92 Luxco, Inc. v. Consejo Regulador del Tequila, A.C., 121 U.S.P.Q.2d 1477 at 21 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 30,
2017) (“In other words, a term that identifies a category of spirit would not be generic if it also serves to
identify geographic origin (e.g., a type of spirit from Mexico).”)..
93 Elliott v. Google, Inc., 856 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2017). The court reasoned:

[V]erb use does not automatically constitute generic use. For instance, Elliott purports to offer an
example of generic use by T-Pain, a popular rap music artist. But we will not assume that T-Pain
is using the word ‘google’ in a generic sense simply because he tells listeners to ‘google [his]
name.’ T-Pain, Bottlez, on rEVOLVEr (RCA Records 2011). Without further evidence regarding
T-Pain’s inner thought process, we cannot tell whether he is using ‘google’ in a discriminate or
indiscriminate sense.
Id.
94 David Kravets, “Comic-Con” Trademark May Have to Activate Superpowers to Survive Attack:
Epic Intellectual Property Battle: San Diego Comic-Con Versus Salt Lake Comic Con, ARS TECHNICA
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/comic-con-trademark-may-have-toactivate-superpowers-to-survive-attack/ [https://perma.cc/P5PR-Z8V8 ] (discussing San Diego Comic
Convention v. Dan Farr Prods., No. 14-CV-1865 AJB (JMA), 2017 WL 4227000 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22,
2017)).
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Arbitration
The PTAB, under constitutional scrutiny in the Supreme Court case Oil
States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.,95 sticks
strictly to issues of patent validity, not deciding contract law issues such as
the validity of an arbitration clause.96 In an interesting case, the USPTO’s
other arm, the Trademark Office, held that an arbitration clause may govern
whether some trademark issues, such as ownership, are determined by an
arbitrator rather than by the USPTO.97 A federal appellate court held that the
celebrity Kardashian sisters did not have the contractual right to compel
arbitration in a cosmetics products dispute: “Like makeup, Florida’s doctrine
of equitable estoppel can only cover so much. It does not provide a nonsignatory with a scalpel to re-sculpt what appears on the face of a contract.”98
Licenses
Most trademark agreements govern the use of the mark. In Chaquico,
the parties (members of a rock n’ roll band) agreed to stop using the mark
Jefferson Starship after a certain date:
[W]ith respect to the trade name “Jefferson Starship”, (hereinafter referred to
as “The Name”), it is agreed between us that The Name shall be retired effective
immediately, with no individual or group, whether or not a party hereto, to be
permitted to use The Name, or any designation substantially similar to The
Name, in any way, including without limitation, in connection with records,
concerts and merchandising. . . .99

Later, some of the band members began performing again under the
name Jefferson Starship, allowing for a possible action for breach of
contract.100 Similarly, in the absence of a contract, the American College of
Veterinary Sports Medicine and Rehabilitation prevailed over a former key
member for ownership of the college’s mark, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
95 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (“We
address the constitutionality of inter partes review only. We do not address whether other patent matters,
such as infringement actions, can be heard in a non-Article III forum.”).
96 See Ford Motor Company v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc., IPR2014-00570 at 6, 2014
WL 4961446 (Sept. 30, 2014) (“The purported “standing” argument raised by Paice, however, relates to
a disputed contractual matter that falls outside the purview of our authority under the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).”).
97 Yufan Hu v. TJ Food Serv., LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1777, 1781 (Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. August 8, 2017) (“Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to honor the parties’ agreement to arbitrate
disputes among its members arising under the operating agreement as to who owns the mark (a question
turning on the parties’ intent).”).
98 Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., 845 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir.
2017).
99 Chaquico v. Freiberg, 274 F. Supp. 3d 942, 945 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
100 Id. at 948-49.
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OF VETERINARY SPORTS MEDICINE AND REHABILITATION.101
There was not sufficient evidence of intent for the member to have sole
ownership of the mark.102 The public associated the college with the mark
and looked to it for quality control, given the college’s broad educational and
certification programs.103 Under the same factors, a manufacturer prevailed
over its exclusive distributor for the rights to the rFOIL brand.104
Distinctiveness
The color yellow could not be registered as a mark for Cheerios boxes
on the grounds that the public did not exclusively associate yellow cereal
boxes with Cheerios.105 FIRST TUESDAY was deemed merely descriptive
as a mark for a state lottery.106

John Deere trailed nutrient applicator attached to a John Deere tractor. 107

John Deere & Co.’s “green and yellow color scheme as it is used on
John Deere tractors is a ‘strong trademark,’” so there was a likelihood of
101

Lyons v. Am. Coll. of Veterinary Sports Med. & Rehab., 859 F.3d 1023, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id..
103 Id. at 1031-32.
104 Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v. TVM Bldg. Prods., Inc., 855 F.3d 163, 167-168 (3d Cir. 2017).
105 In re General Mills IP Holdings II, LLC, 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 at 1028 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2017).
106 In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The court concluded the explanatory
text accompanying the mark:
102

[S]imply uses the same two words as the mark—’first Tuesday’—along with words like ‘new’
and ‘every month’ to describe the relevant feature or characteristic of N.C. Lottery’s scratch-off
lottery games. The commercial context here demonstrates that a consumer would immediately
understand the intended meaning of FIRST TUESDAY. In other words, the evidence shows that
the mark is less an identifier of the source of goods or services and more a description of a feature
or characteristic of those goods or services.
Id.
107
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17:1 (2018)

Top Tens in 2017

confusion when a competitor applied the same color scheme on similar
machinery.108

109

A design mark for such goods as furniture, dinnerware, and fabrics sold
by Shabby Chic was not registrable, as it was found to be too similar to the
“official emblem of the Prince of Wales.”

110

108

Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 837, 882, 894 (W.D. Ky. 2017).
Image of Shabby Chic mark and Prince of Wales’s emblem, in John L. Welch, Keeping Tabs on
the TTAB, THE TTABLOG (Apr. 6. 2017), https://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/04/precedential-no-7ttab-affirms-section.html [https://perma.cc/5J7L-RFB7].
110 Image of London taxi, in Annsley Merelle Ward, Arnold J’s latest judgement flags down the
iconic (but not distinctive) London black cab, THE IPKAT, (Feb. 9, 2016),
109
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A UK court denied protection for the famous shape of the London
taxi.111
Nonprotected Functional Matter

112

Horizontal ribbing for reclosable plastic bags was denied registration as
being functional.113

114

http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2016/02/arnold-js-latest-judgment-flags-down.html
[https://perma.cc/26XV-YD8K].
111 Id.
112 Image of plastic bags, in John L. Welch, Precedential No. 33: TTAB Orders Cancellation of Three
Registrations for Bag Closure Configuration Marks Due to Section 2(e)(5) Functionality, THE TTABLOG
(Oct.
20,
2017),
http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/10/ttab-orders-cancellation-of-three.html
[https://perma.cc/6F75-86XA].
113 Poly-America, L.P. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 124 USPQ2d 1508, 1519-1520 (T.T.A.B. 2017);
see also Welch, supra note 112.
114 Image appears at Blumenthal Distrib. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. ED CV14-01926 JAK (SPx),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121041, at *66 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2017).
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The design of the well-known Aeron chair by Herman Miller Inc. was
deemed functional and so not protectable as trade dress.115

116

The design of a wind turbine was likewise not protectable as trade dress,
in light of its many functional advantages, such that it “generates electricity
regardless of wind direction.”117

115 Blumenthal Distrib. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. ED CV14-01926 JAK (SPx), 2017 WL 3271706,
at *28 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2017).
116 U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 86046590 (filed August, 23, 2013),
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=+86046590+&caseSearchType=US_APPLICATION&caseType=D
EFAULT&searchType=statusSearch .
117 In re Change Wind Corp., 123 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, at 19 (T.T.A.B. July 20, 2017) (quotation from
Applicant’s product brochure).
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Lawful Use Required for Registration

118

119

The mark Herbal Access was denied registration in 2016 for lack of
“lawful use.”120 Even in states that may permit marijuana sales, federal laws
still prohibit them.121 That was not changed, in the view of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), when Congress prohibited use of funds to
enforce prohibitions where states have legalized medical marijuana.122
In related news, the TTAB refused registration of MARIJUANAVILLE
as confusingly similar to Jimmy Buffet’s MARGARITAVILLE. 123 The
marks created highly similar commercial impressions of a “chemically
induced mental paradise” (notably, a state in which there is a pervasive
118

Image of Herbal Access mark, in John L. Welch, Precedential No. 21: Marijuana Sale Illegal,
TTAB Affirms Herbal Access Refusal for Retail Services, THE TTABlog (July, 18, 2016),
https://thettablog.blogspot.com/search?q=herbal [https://perma.cc/CCK8-26ZV].
119 Image of Pharma Cannis mark, in John L. Welch, Precedential No. 17: TTAB Affirms Refusal of
PHARMACANN for Medical Marijuana Services Due to Illegality under CSA, THE TTABlog (June 19,
2017) https://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/06/precedential-no-16-ttab-affirms-refusal.html [https://
perma.cc/U8G5-98N8].
120 In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 16 (T.T.A.B. July 14, 2016) (“Because the evidence
that Applicant’s mark is being used in connection with sales of a specific substance (marijuana) that falls
within both the services identification and the prohibitions of the CSA is unrebutted, we find that
Applicant’s retail store services include sales of a good that is illegal under federal law, and therefore
encompasses a use that is unlawful.”).
121 Id.
122 In re PharmaCann LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q.2d 1122, 24-25 (T.T.A.B. June 16, 2017) (“We must
determine the eligibility of marijuana-related marks for federal registration by reference to the CSA as it
is written, not as it might be enforced at any point in time by any particular Justice Department. The CSA
in its current form makes Applicant’s intended uses of its marks unlawful, and its marks are thus ineligible
for federal registration.”).
123 See David Kluft, Marijuanaville v. Margaritaville: Registering Trademarks For Chemically
Induced Mental Paradises, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW BLOG (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2017/04/marijuanaville-v-margaritaville-registeringtrademarks-for-chemically-induced-mental-paradises/ [https://perma.cc/PC88-GF8V].
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likelihood of confusion).124 From the same era, both Blues Brothers appeared
in trademark cases as well. BELUSHI’S was refused registration for a
restaurant business unrelated to John Belushi.125 Crystal Head Vodka, owned
in part by Dan Akroyd, won a trade dress case against a company selling
vodka in similarly skull-shaped bottles.126
Mutilation and Phantom Marks

127

In a case highlighting the sometimes alarming jargon of intellectual
property, the University of Miami was able to register the design mark above,
overcoming issues of “mutilation” (application not representing mark as
actually used) and “phantom mark” (application reserving multiple marks by
leaving blank space for additional elements).128

124

Id.
In re Beds & Bars Ltd., 122 U.S.P.Q.2d 1546, 18 (T.T.A.B. May 5, 2017).
126 Globefill Inc. v. Elements Spirits, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-02034-CBM (PLAx), 2017 WL 6520589, 23 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 8, 2017).
127 Image of University of Miami design mark, in John L. Welch, TTAB Reverses Mutilation and
Phantom Mark Refusals of U. Miami Ibis Design, THE TTABLOG (Jun. 8, 2017),
http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/06/precedential-no-13-ttab-reverses.html [https://perma.cc/393U2BR6].
128 John L. Welch, TTAB Reverses Mutilation and Phantom Mark Refusals of U. Miami Ibis Design,
THE TTABLOG (Jun. 8, 2017), http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2017/06/precedential-no-13-ttabreverses.html [https://perma.cc/393U-2BR6].
125
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COPYRIGHT
Nonprotected Functional Matter

129

Is the header to a Java application programming interface similar to a
cheerleading uniform? That is the question on software copyright after the

129 Image of cheerleader uniform designs, in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.
Ct. 1002, 1017 (2017).
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Supreme Court decision in Star Athletica.130 A long-standing issue in
copyright, especially important for software, is distinguishing
nonprotectable functional matter from protectable expressive matter. In Star
Athletica, the Supreme Court increased copyright protection for functional
works, holding that cheerleader uniform designs are not precluded from
protection as functional.131 The Court upheld copyright in the design of
cheerleader uniforms, which consisted primarily of “‘combinations,
positionings, and arrangements of elements’ that include ‘chevrons . . . ,
lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted [chevrons], coloring, and
shapes.’”132 Star Athletica replaced a number of vague tests formulated by
courts over the years with a single, if elusive, test: “In sum, a feature of the
design of a useful article is eligible for copyright if, when identified and
imagined apart from the useful article, it would qualify as a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in some other tangible
medium.”133 The Court reasoned:
Applying this test to the surface decorations on the cheerleading uniforms is
straightforward. First, one can identify the decorations as features having
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. Second, if the arrangement of colors,
shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the surface of the cheerleading uniforms
were separated from the uniform and applied in another medium—for example,
on a painter’s canvas—they would qualify as “two-dimensional . . . works
of . . . art,” §101. And imaginatively removing the surface decorations from the
uniforms and applying them in another medium would not replicate the uniform
itself. Indeed, respondents have applied the designs in this case to other media
of expression—different types of clothing—without replicating the
uniform. See App. 273–279. The decorations are therefore separable from the
uniforms and eligible for copyright protection.134

The direct effect is more protection for fashion design, an industry ripe
for knock-offs.

130
131
132
133
134

Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1017 (2017).
Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
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135

In a similar matter, a fabric design was held protected and infringed. 136
Originality Requirement

137

135 Image of fabric designs, in Loni Morrow & Catherine Holland, Urban Outfitters Hit with Willful
Copyright Infringement, KNOBBE MARTENS (May 9, 2017), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/05
/urban-outfitters-hit-willful-copyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/F4CZ-H834].
136 Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 2017).
137 Image of “We Will Overcome” sheet music, in We Shall Overcome Found. & Butler Films v.
Richmond Org., Inc. (TRO INC.), No. 16cv2725(DLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146228, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 8, 2017).
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The copyright of the song “We Shall Overcome” was registered 1960
and renewed in 1988.138 In a declaratory judgment action brought by
filmmakers, the court in 2017 held that a slightly-altered newer version lacks
sufficient new creative elements, when compare to such predecessors as “We
Will Overcome,” to qualify for copyright.139 The court noted, “More
specifically, the changes of ‘will’ to ‘shall’ and ‘down’ to ‘deep’ and the
melodic differences in the opening measures and the seventh measure, do
not create a distinguishable variation. These differences represent ‘variations
of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any competent
musician.’”140
Other older works will start entering the public domain at the end of
2018, for a different reason: 1923 + 28 + 28 + 19 + 20 = 2018.141 Patents last
about 17 years, so valuable patents expire every year. Hence the “patent
dance” discussed above for generic pharmaceuticals entering the market.
Copyright, less so. If Yes! We Have No Bananas was published with a proper
copyright notice in 1923, it would get a copyright term of 28 years (until
1951).142 A renewal would extend the term by another 28 years (until
1979).143 Then the 1976 Copyright Act extended the terms of such copyrights
by 19 years, until 1998 in this case.144 In 1998, Congress once again extended
copyright by 20 years, giving Yes! We Have No Bananas a term expiring in
2019.145 Other works from that time period will gradually follow, as their
copyrights begin to expire.
Copyright in Standards
The Copyright Act itself is not copyrighted. The copyright statute bars
copyright in U.S. governmental works.146 Courts have expanded the rule to
cover other legal documents, such as state judicial opinions. To have
copyright in such works would raise real questions of due process and the
First Amendment. The question becomes more complex where a private
138

Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *35.
140 Id. at *36 (citation omitted). The parties later settled. See Christopher Melejan, ‘We Shall
Overcome’ Is Put in Public Domain in a Copyright Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/media/we-shall-overcome-copyright.html
[https://perma.cc/3YQ3-CKKE].
141 See Public Domain Day: January 1, 2018, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/cspd/
publicdomainday/ [https://perma.cc/6YXG-X79B].
142 Duration
of Copyright 2, Circulation 15A.0811, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6TF-WT3E].
143 Id. at 2.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 17 U.S.C § 105 (2012).
139
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entity drafts a statute (such as a model municipal code on a subject) or
regulation that is later adopted as law. Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials
upheld copyright in “private sector codes and standards [drafted] in order to
advance public safety, ensure compatibility across products and services,
facilitate training, and spur innovation.”147 The court rejected a finding of fair
use in online posts of such codes and standards by a nonprofit.148
Meaning of “Noncommercial” in Free Licenses

149

The above comic appears on the xkcd website. At the bottom of the
webpage, a link to details regarding licensing the comic leads to this text:

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
2.5
License.
This means that you are free to copy and reuse any of my drawings
(noncommercially) as long as you tell people where they’re from.

147 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14623,
at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017) rev’d in part Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
896 F.3d 437, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19603, at *441 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2018) (citing the district court’s
error in applying fair use doctrines).
148 Id. at *63.
149 Randall Munroe, Open Source (comic), XKCD (Feb. 19, 2007), https://xkcd.com/225/
[https://perma.cc/2TWM-ZZUS].
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That is, you don’t need my permission to post these pictures on your website
(and hotlinking with <img> is fine); just include a link back to this page. Or you
can make Livejournal icons from them, but -- if possible -- put xkcd.com in the
comment field. You can use them freely (with some kind of link) in not-forprofit publications, and I’m also okay with people reprinting occasional comics
(with clear attribution) in publications like books, blogs, newsletters, and
presentations. If you’re not sure whether your use is noncommercial, feel free
to email me and ask (if you’re not sure, it’s probably okay). 150

A creator may license her work under a free software or open source
license to keep the work free of copyright restrictions.151 The license allows
others to use the work without cost, but not to put any resulting work under
a restrictive license. Some such licenses limit such uses to noncommercial
use, while some deem such a restrictive license not to qualify as free, in the
sense of licensing without any restriction. In one of the few cases interpreting
such licenses, a noncommercial-use-only open license was held to allow a
for-profit copy shop to make copies of a work.152 The case has implications
for the widely used noncommercial-use-only version of the Creative
Commons License. It has less importance for free software licenses like the
General Public License, which do not contain restrictions on categories of
use.153
Is it fair use to use a free-licensed work without complying with the
terms of the license? One court reasoned that there was no market harm, the

150

License, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/license.html [https://perma.cc/5MU3-WPRS] (last visited Oct.
15, 2018) (emphasis added).
151 Other licensors simply license the work without restriction, allowing others to do as they may
with it.
152 Great Minds v. FedEx Office & Print Servs., No. 16-CV-1462 (DRH)(ARL), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26332, *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017), aff’d, 886 F.3d 91 (2d Cir, 2018). The court examined
the limits of such a license:
Nor can the reservation of rights contained in the License be read to preclude a licensee from
hiring someone to make copies of the Materials so the licensee can use them for a
“noncommercial” purpose. The applicable provision states in relevant part: “To the extent
possible, Licensor waives any right to collect royalties from You for the exercise of the Licensed
Rights. . . . In all other cases the Licensor expressly reserves any right to collect such royalties,
including when the Licensed Material is used other than for NonCommerical Purposes.” Rather,
the unambiguous import of this provision is to reserve GM’s right to collect royalties from a
licensee if the licensee exceeds the scope of the license by, for example, selling copies of the
Materials.
Id.
153 Richard Stallman, Why Programs Must Not Limit the Freedom to Run Them, GNU,
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/programs-must-not-limit-freedom-to-run.html (“Free software means
software controlled by its users, rather than the reverse. Specifically, it means the software comes with
four essential freedoms that software users deserve. At the head of the list is freedom 0, the freedom to
run the program as you wish, in order to do what you wish.”).
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work having been released for free.154 If fair use allows the use of freelicensed works without complying with the license terms, some could be
dissuaded from offering to share their works under free licenses. Moreover,
the quid pro quo for using such works is the benefit from compliance, such
as attribution to the author. Lack of attribution could then be a cognizable
harm (as opposed to other reputational harms flowing from fair uses such as
criticism and commentary).
Secondary-ish Copyright Infringement
Amazon was not liable for copyright infringement where Amazon
provided third-party sellers the use of Amazon’s “logistical network.”155
Amazon stores the goods for sellers then ships them off when sold on the
Amazon site.156 Amazon did not distribute the goods by sale (necessary for
infringement) because title of the goods does not pass from Amazon to the
buyer. 157 The court rejected arguments that Amazon was akin to a consignee
and so should be treated as selling the goods.158
A provider of USENET bulletin board services was not liable for
infringing postings by its users where there “were no simple measures
available that Giganews failed to take to remove Perfect 10’s works from its
servers.”159 By contrast, using volunteer moderators for an internet service
could be posting by the service itself, as opposed to posting photos on the
site by users.160 The service was not protected by the statutory immunity
applicable to content posted by users.161
154 Philpot v. Media Research Ctr. Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d 708, 720 (E.D. Va. 2018). The court
reasoned:

Plaintiff argues that defendant’s failure to attribute the Kid Rock and Chesney Photographs
diminished the future value of plaintiff’s photographs because attribution would make plaintiff
famous, thereby making his Photographs more valuable “probably after [he] die[s].” Pl. Dep.
36:12-22. This argument is unpersuasive because the Supreme Court has recognized that courts
evaluating the fourth fair use factor should consider whether a particular use “produce[s] a harm
cognizable under the Copyright Act.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. For example, the Supreme Court
in Campbell noted that because “there is no protectable derivative market for criticism,” courts
should not consider harm to the market for parodies in evaluating the fourth fair use
factor. Id. These principles, applied here, point persuasively to the conclusion that future harm
caused by lack of attribution should similarly be disregarded in evaluating the fourth fair use
factor.
Id.
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
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See Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879, 881, 885–91 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 881.
Id. at 886–87.
Id. at 887–88.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 671 (9th Cir. 2017).
Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 853 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1030-31.
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Fair Use
Courts have resisted extending doctrines like first sale to digital copies
of works. In the 2013 Redigi case, an intermediary’s online sales of copies
of music was held not to be a protected first sale of the copy, but rather the
making of more infringing copies (one to upload, one to download).162 In a
different case, the Ninth Circuit rejected what it deemed a form-oversubstance process to avoid copyright in streaming.163 VidAngel purchased
movies on DVDs to stream them to users for one dollar.164 VidAngel
characterized the transaction as selling the disc to the user for $20 and then
repurchasing it for $1, all the while maintaining physical possession of the
disc, so the user was streaming their own copy.165 The court held that fair use
did not apply.166 First, VidAngel did not use an authorized copy of the movie;
it rather circumvented both access and copying controls in order to make a
digital copy from the DVD for streaming.167 Nor was the use transformative,
because editing out content did not transform the work—and in any case
users typically requested little or no editing and instead simply watched the
movie.168 Nor did the company’s actions qualify for time-shifting as under
Sony, because that case involved consumers copying a movie on their own
VCRs for the consumers’ later use.169
A small amount of copying from a song into a musical? Fair use.170
Copying software code with minimal expressive content? There may be
infringement.171 Using a YouTube video to critique it? Fair use.172
162 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court held
the first sale defense is:

[L]imited to material items, like records, that the copyright owner put into the stream of
commerce. Here, ReDigi is not distributing such material items; rather, it is
distributing reproductions of the copyrighted code embedded in new material objects, namely,
the ReDigi server in Arizona and its users’ hard drives. The first sale defense does not cover this
any more than it covered the sale of cassette recordings of vinyl records in a bygone era.
Id.
163

See Disney Enters. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 862 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 854.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 862.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 861.
169 Id. at 862.
170 Corbello v. DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1078 (D. Nev. 2017).
171 See, e,g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
172 Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). In this case, the court
investigated the ever-popular YouTube video genre of reaction videos:
164

Here, it is clear to the Court that the Klein video does not serve as a market substitute for the Hoss
video; anyone seeking to enjoy “Bold Guy v. Parkour Girl” on its own will have a very different
experience watching the Klein video, which responds to and transforms the Hoss video from a
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Incorporating an old newspaper article in a news report? Not necessarily fair
use.173

174

Artist Richard Prince was largely successful in a past lawsuit, arguing
that fair use protected his incorporation of photographs into his art.175 But his
tweeting of similar photographs was held not to qualify as fair use as a matter
of law, rather requiring further factual determinations.176
Limits on Copyright
Internet streaming services failed to convince a court to extend to them
the compulsory license for retransmission by cable systems.177 Copyright
law, like patent law, continues to see questions regarding the international
reach of U.S. intellectual property rights. If the infringing conduct occurs
outside the United States, then the mere fact that it was supported by some

skit into fodder for caustic, moment-by-moment commentary and mockery. Because the Klein
video does not “offer [] a substitute for the original,” it does not (and indeed, cannot) “usurp a
market that properly belongs to the copyright-holder.”
Id. (quoting Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)).
173 Hirsch v. CBS Broad. Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123468, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017).
174 Donald Graham, Rastafarian Smoking a Joint (photograph), DONALD GRAHAM,
https://donaldgraham.com/PORTRAITS/5 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
175 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013).
176 Graham v. Prince, 265 F.3d 366, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
177 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. AereoKiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017).
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conduct within the U.S. will not trigger liability under the U.S. copyright
statute.178
Discharge in Bankruptcy
Is liability for copyright infringement dischargeable in bankruptcy?
Liability for “willful and malicious injury” is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.179 Where a defendant knowingly participated in broad-ranging
infringement through unauthorized access to television programming, hefty
statutory damages applied and were held nondischargeable.180
When Registration Occurs
A U.S. author must register a copyright before filing an infringement
suit. The federal courts of appeals have split on the issue of “whether
registration occurs when an owner files an application to register the
copyright or when the Register of Copyrights registers the copyright.”181
Registration may occur upon filing, or may occur only when the Copyright
Office acts.
TRADE SECRETS
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is often the tool of choice
for parties complaining of trade secret misappropriation, and for broader
theories aimed at any “unauthorized” use of computers.182 A furniture
company switching email systems issued the password “Password1” to all
employees.183 One manager used the password to enter other employee
accounts, taking screenshots of hundreds of emails.184 When sued under the
CFAA, the employee contended that there had not been the $5,000 in losses
required to trigger liability under the terms of the statute, because there was
no interruption of service, although there had been funds spent to investigate
the problem. Courts have differed on what the phrase “interruption of

178

Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 799–800 (5th Cir. 2017).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
180 China Cent. Television v. Bhalla (In re Bhalla), 573 B.R. 265, 281 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017).
181 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017);
see also Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010) (registration
occurs on filing); La Resolana Architects, Pa. v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th
Cir. 2005) (registration occurs upon approval of application).
182 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The government’s interpretation
would transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an expansive misappropriation statute.”).
183 Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, 846 F.3d 1167, 1171 (11th Cir. 2017).
184 Id.
179
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service” modifies in the statute’s definition. 185The statutory definition of loss
in the CFAA is lengthy, and its last phrase dangles ambiguously:
[T]he term “loss” means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost
of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the
data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offenses, and
any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service.186

The court followed the narrower reading, that “interruption of service”
does not qualify “cost incurred” (here, the investigation costs).187
The employee argued also that the costs of investigation—”an extensive
forensic and physical review” of the company’s systems—were not caused
by his actions.188 He told them how he had accessed the information: using
the password “Password1” issued to all employees.189 The court held that,
since he refused access to his laptop, the company was reasonable in making
a thorough investigation.190
Import Bars
Lawyers increasingly use International Trade Commission (ITC)
proceedings (which may be more streamlined than litigation, although
without big damage awards) to seek import bans on products made using
trade secrets. A 25-year ban on imports from a trade secret misappropriation
case survived review by the Federal Circuit.191 The court declined to simply
look at the length of bans imposed in other cases, and rather looked to the
relevant policies:
In an attempt to rebut the Commission’s decision to impose a 25-year exclusion
order in this case, Organik Kimya points to various cases to support its assertion
185 See Nosal, supra note 182, at 862 (“We remain unpersuaded by the decisions of our sister circuits
that interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use restrictions or violations
of a duty of loyalty; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.2010); United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir.2006).”).
186
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2012).
187 846 F.3d at 1174. The court parsed the definition as follows:

We agree with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. The plain language of the statutory definition
includes two separate types of loss: (1) reasonable costs incurred in connection with such activities
as responding to a violation, assessing the damage done, and restoring the affected data, program
system, or information to its condition prior to the violation; and (2) any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.
Id.
188
189
190
191
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Id. at 1174–75.
Id.
Id. at 1171.
Organik Kimya, San. V. Tic. A.S., 848 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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that exclusion orders in trade secret misappropriation cases typically last five to
ten years. As Organik Kimya itself recognizes, however, the Commission bases
the time period of a limited exclusion order on a “reasonable research and
development period” or an “independent development time” for the trade
secrets at issue. . . . The length of the exclusion order therefore depends on the
trade secrets at issue and evidence in the record, not the particular length of
exclusion orders in other cases.192

The immunity for online service providers may limit remedies for trade
secret misappropriation by their users. Under the Communications Decency
Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 230, a U.S. court declined to enforce a Canadian
injunction requiring Google to delete search results pages showing products
made with purloined trade secrets.193
Preclusive Effect of ITC Rulings
A patent decision by the ITC does not bind a court in subsequent
proceedings. But, with respect to trade secrets (where federal courts do not
have exclusive jurisdiction), courts will apply preclusion.194
Not All “Proprietary Information” Is a Trade Secret
As every year, courts resisted trade secret claims in internal documents
without a showing of value from secrecy and reasonable security
measures.195
IP rights may depend on local practices, as in a trade secret case brought
by a Sarasota boat builder. The information at issue—suppliers’ names and
production costs—were readily determined due to local industry practices,
and so did not qualify as trade secrets.196 Perhaps (see Margaritaville
discussion above) people may be sociable and less concerned with legalities.

192

Id. at 1005.
Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182194
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017).
194 Manitowoc Cranes LLC v. Sany Am. Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202860, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Dec.
11, 2017) (citing Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1985)).
195 The court emphasized the need to specifically identify claimed trade secrets:
193

Here, Deaconess has done nothing more than provided a general recitation that the documents in
question satisfy the elements constituting a trade secret and then made a conclusory statement that
disclosure of the documents would provide competitors with an advantage. Deaconess has failed
to identify anything “unique or distinctive” about its policies and procedures that are different
from those employed by other competitors in the healthcare market.
Borum v. Smith, No. 4:17-CV-00017-JHM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91127, at *7 (W.D. Ky. June 14,
2017).
196 Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC, 237 F.3d 1230, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2017). The
court summarized:
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Patents and Trade Secrets
In another repeating theme, a court rejected (without prejudice to amend
the complaint) trade secret claims on the grounds that the relevant
information had been disclosed in a patent and no additional specific trade
secret refinement of the invention had been shown.197
Amending Complaint
Where a trade secret complaint is dismissed without prejudice, the
plaintiff may succeed by amending it to include specific trade secret
information. In Space Data Corp. v. X, “the Court [found] that the TAC
provides sufficient allegations that make it plausible that Space Data’s
purported trade secrets— ‘hover algorithm,’ ‘thermal management
techniques,’ and the ‘altitude control and monitoring system’—were
preserved as confidential under the NDA.”198
Databases
Trade secret law grows in importance in the age of data (and the
nonpatentability of natural DNA sequences). A valuable database of deer
DNA was protected by an injunction:
NADR’s [North American Deer Registry’s] member list, deer genetic
information, and deer lineages are its trade secrets. NADR expended significant time
and effort in creating its Registry. Cassidy and Lyon each recognized that no other
deer registry has as many as 230,000 animals. Further, NADR took significant steps
to keep its biological materials, genetic information, genotype analysis data, and
membership directory secret. NADR’s efforts have been memorialized in three
contracts it had with DNAS and in the previous agreements of the North American
Deer
Farmers
Association
and
Texas
Deer
Association. 199

Yellowfin alleges that Kevin Barker, who downloaded several hundred files from Yellowfin’s
main server on his last day at Yellowfin, misappropriated secret supplier and customer
information. But a supplier’s identity is well-known, and Barker Boatworks lacks the size and
history to secure a discount from a supplier. And Barker learned Yellowfin’s production costs in
the ordinary course of business at Yellowfin. No reasonable jury could conclude that the supplier
information is a trade secret.
Id.
197 AutoTrakk, LLC v. Auto. Leasing Specialists, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106188, 18-19 (M.D.
Pa. July 10, 2017), aff’d. 898 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2018).
198 Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, Space Data Corp. v.
X, No. 16-cv-03260-BLF (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18. 2017).
199 N. Am. Deer Registry, Inc. v. DNA Sols., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84687, at *20–21 (E.D.
Tex. June 2, 2017).
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Reverse Engineering Prohibitions
Reverse engineering software, contrary to a clause in the relevant
license, may be breach of contract, but not necessarily support for an
injunction.200
Security Measures
Reasonable security measures are necessary to create legal protection
for trade secrets. Such measures may be shown without proving that the
security was never breached.201
Arbitration
An employer that files a trade secret action may thereby waive its
contractual right to pursue the matter in arbitration.202

200

SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 388-389 (4th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Liew, 856 F.3d 585, 601 (9th Cir. 2017).
202 George L. Kanabe & Tierra Piens, USE IT OR LOSE IT! Enforce Your Arbitration Agreement or
Waive Your Right to Arbitrate Your Trade Secret Misappropriation Claims, ORRICK (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/ [http://perma.cc/2A2J-XQFK] (discussing AFS Logistics,
LLC v. Cochran, No. 3:16-cv-3139, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181081 (M.D. Tenn. 2017)).
201
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